The Open Court. by unknown
-Y
The Open Court
A WEEKLY aOUEISTAL
Devoted to the ^A/'ork of Conciliating Religion -with Science.
No. 242. (Vol. VI.— 15. CHICAGO, APRIL 14, 1892. ( Two Dollars per Year.
I
Single Copies, 5 Cents.
Copyright bv The Open Court Publishing Co.—Reprints are permitted only on condition of giving full credit to Antho
THE RELATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL TO THE
COMMUNITY.*
by wilhelm wundt.
[continued.]
II. RATIONALISM AND UTILITARIANISM. THEIR CONCEP-
TIONS OF RELIGION, ETHICS, LANGUAGE, AND
STATE UNTENABLE.
Hegel's ideas have left behind many traces in mod-
ern political science. If the representatives of the so-
called "organic-states-doctrine," (which holds that the
state is an organism) do not merely apply the idea of
the organism to the political whole,—against which
no objection is to be made,—but are concerned also
according to the example of Plato and the Platonic
theories of earlier centuries, in searching out special
relations between the organs of the individual organ-
ism and the parts of the administration of states,
these attempts at reviving the public interest in the
community, produce exactly the opposite effect to that
intended. Social organisms are deprived of their pe-
culiar dignity, when they are made enlarged images of
individuals.
In a similar sense, the modern social theory has
used the so-called "real analogies," with greater wis-
dom, in that it seeks to explain social phenomena by
means of well-known physiological processes. Such
comparisons as e. g. those of economic intercourse
with change of matter, may be permissible and useful
so long, as one limits himself to illustrating compound
by simple phenomena that are like them in certain
qualities. But as soon as the analogy is used not
merely as an appropriate representation, but transforms
itself into a constant relation between the social and
the corresponding physiological processes, the danger
of false analogies might be greater than their didactic
advantage.
We can hardly censure juridical statesmen if many
among them still continue to prefer to the phantastic
constructions of the older organic states doctrine as
well as to the physiological analogies of modern so-
ciology, the contract theory, which if it be both psy-
* This is the substance of a lecture delivered as an oration by Professor
Wundt on the birthday festival of the King of Saxony. The oration was pub-
lished in the Deutsche Rundschau.
chologically impossible and historically untrue, is, at
least, from a legal point of view, clearly conceived.
Analogies are indeed generally of doubtful value. But
if they are at all applicable, a comparison of the state
and its magistrates to a business company and its em-
ployes, will be more instructive than a renewal of the
old Platonic opinion that the state is nothing but a
man of vast proportions.
I attempt no decision, as to how extensive a role
those old philosophic antitheses, still play in the dif-
ferences of opinion existing to-day between jurists and
sociologists, between Romanists and Germanists. They
are often less concerned about the great communities
of nation and state than about such corporations as
can arise voluntarily, within a national and political
community at the call of special social purposes. Psy-
chological contemplation, conformably to its general
task will be necessarily limited to those social bonds
that have arisen naturally and which therefore, in some
form, everywhere determine the order of human life.
But whatever other estimate may be placed upon its
value, the psychological view of the subject has the
one advantage over the concept developments of phi-
losophy that it is secure from the danger of losing
sight entirely of the relations between the individual
and the whole or of explaining them away to mere
analogies. For Psychology throughout has at com-
mand only the attributes of individual consciousness
as the ultimate principle of explanation and yet at the
same time, she is everywhere referred by experience
to the limits of the experience and the work of the in-
dividual. In opposition to such standpoints, which
are limited fundamentally like the juridical and the
political to the phenomena of legal and political life,
psychology is perhaps in the fortunate condition of
being able to procure for comparison other products of
the intellectual life of a significance of a similarly uni-
versal validity and thus explain the more difficult by
the more simple, although she must stand modestly in
the rear when the solution of particular practical
problems is in question.
In fact, legal order and the state constitute only
highly developed forms of a common life, that early
expresses itself in the one language uniting a national
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or race community, in its peculiar religious and myth-
ological views, finally in ethical rules that have a bind-
ing force for all. Although, according to the current
-conception, these phenomena are of earlier origin than
state and law, yet, they certainly belong with state and
law to that same class of spiritual creations, for whose
origin a multitude of individuals living together is in-
dispensable ; and they are especially analogous in this
that ethics includes rules, and rules can to some extent
be regarded as the first steps of a legal order and a state
organisation.
Now it is a remarkable fact that the rationalism of
the eighteenth century universally embraced notions
concerning the origin of language, religion, and morals,
that correspond perfectly to the theory of the social
contract. Language was regarded as a system of signs,
arbitrarily devised for the understanding and expres-
sion of thought. Religions, they said, are founded by
wise, moral teachers; or they are, according to the
favorite reversal of this conception by the radical free-
thinkers of the revolutionary age, the fraudulent in-
ventions of cunning priests, who seek, by these means,
to keep the people in darkness and dependence. Simi-
larly myths and sagas are said to be poems which
were intentionally invented sometimes for educational
purposes, and sometimes for the propagation of fraud
and deception. But from as many causes as the phe-
nomena of the common life may be derived, all these
explanations were one in this that those products of
the national spirit were supposed to be thought out by
individuals for the purposes for which they can be
used at the present stage of civilisation ; and that the
attributes of man, since time inconceivable, conform
exactly to the mode of thinking of the enlightened
philosopher of the eighteenth century. The utilitarian
considerations of a philosophy whose faith in its own
unsurpassability has scarcely ever been reattained, ap-
peared to be a truth quite axiomatic and of universal
validity; it was deemed hardly possible, that there
ever could have been men who felt and thought' other-
wise.
To-day we readily surrender the assertion that lan-
guage arose by agreement. But it easily escapes our
observation, that the opinion that state and law rest
upon a necessarily presupposed contract between in-
dividuals, contains a circle of errors of a similar char
acter. This distinction in the criticism of theories
which are perfectly analogous to one another and which
have issued from the same general conception of hu
man relations, certainly has reasons that are good and
not to h^ undervalued.
If new forms of state arise to-day among civilised
nations, such forms can win a universal legal sanction
only by constitutional contracts. It is plain, there-
fore, that this actual existence of state contracts, has
a more real significance for the formation of the
state, than perhaps the possibility of inventing a lan-
guage like Volapiik has for the origin of language.
But first those legal acts which lend to the existence
of a state its legal sanction, do not, in the least, under
present relations, embrace the conditions of their ori-
gin, but that sanction itself is possible only upon the
basis of conditions that cohere with the totality of
qualities and historical events of a national commu-
nity. Thus the New German Empire could not have
arisen had not the community of will of the German
races which strove after this unification, existed prior
to the treaties between the states and the princes. In a
civilised community, every new political creation needs
a legal sanction .to insure it against attacks from
within and without. But this sanction is the last not
the first member in the circle of the factors of origin
;
and among primitive relations it is wholly lacking.
The natural race community, when the overtowering
will of a single leader is added, is here sufficient to
engender a political organisation.
But what is the significance of speaking of a con-
tract "tacitly concluded," where no contract whatever
exists ? I suppose one could with the same right trace
language back to a " tacit agreement. " In view of this
actual development the old debated question whether
law is of earlier origin than the state or vice versa pro-
ceeds in about the same line as the famous zoolog-
ical question, whether the egg was prior to the hen.
Law and state arose, not" as new creations, suddenly
and without preparation, but they issued from the
rules of ethics and the primitive forms of the race-
community. As soon as this latter received the char-
acter of a state, definite rules of ethics became the
fundamental essentials of a legal order,, and again as
soon as ethics became condensed into law, the com-
munity, which subjected itself to legal rules, developed
at the same time from a mere horde of people into a
politically organised national community.
If national and state communities are not arbitrary
creations, if they are not artificially compounded bod-
ies, as Thomas Hobbes once called them, but evolu-
tionary products of primitive forms of common life,
the active powers of this life are to be sought else-
where than upon the basis of those utilitarian consid-
erations, to which, according to the rationalistic phi-
losophy of the previous century, which is even yet
influential, all the intellectual impulses of the human
race are said to owe their origin. The fundamental
conditions for the origin of the spiritual creations of a
community, are nowhere so plainly visible as in lan-
guage, not only in its dependence on the qualities of
individuals, but also in its being different from that
which the individual as such can produce.
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Impulsive movements which have their source in
the perceptions and affections of the individual con-
sciousness are possible, indeed, without any relation
to the environment and without stimulation by the
same. They are the natural products of the spiritual
and corporeal organisation of the individual man. But
such movements of expression, can become language
only when they arise in a community, where the mem-
bers live amid the same external and internal condi-
tions, so that the sensations and perceptions, which
one member finds in himself, are also not lacking in the
other, and so that the sound-movement, to which, per-
ceptions and affections impel the first are an expression
of common experience directly intelligible to the ear
of the other.
Thus language is a creation of individuals and yet
infinitely more. For it can only arise when the in-
tellectual life is common and directly experienced as
such. Therefore language truly is a product of the
collective mind, and as it is related to the impulsive
expressions of individual sensations, which give them-
selves vent in natural interjections and other involun-
tary movements of expression, just so is the collective
mind related to individual minds conceived as isolated.
As language possesses no existence outside of those
who speak it, so also the collective mind is no spiritual
being, which lives and develops outside of individuals,
but it is the intellectual association of individuals
themselves. But for just this reason it is also infinitely
more than a sum of individuals. As little as a lan-
guage could arise from a mere collection of individual
sounds of expression, just so little is an intellectual,
associative life conceivable without that primitive
equality of intellectual processes in the members of the
community, by means of which through an exchange
of sentiments and ideas the spiritual life of the indi-
vidual is stimulated and strengthened by the life of its
environment in ortler to retroact in its turn with sim-
ilar power upon the collective spirit of the community.
Therefore the common life is never a mere accumu-
lation of individual effects. I would not even like to
compare it to a multiplication,—if it were permissible
to illustrate these things by mathematical symbols,
—
since multiplication always produces only magnitudes
of the same character as the original. The spiritual
creations of the community on the contrary are new
creations, the cause of whose origin, it is true, lies in
individuals, but they present qualitatively as well as
quantitatively new values. This relation could perhaps
be symbolised through that of complex numbers to in-
tegrals, since complex numbers would not exist with-
out integrals, in contrast to which they notwithstand-
ing present a qualitatively new, conceptual domain,
to which one would never obtain through mere opera-
tions of quantitative multiplication.
Language however is by no means such a function
of common life, which must be presupposed as an in-
dispensable medium for the production of common
views and rules of action, so that it should be judged
differently than the very spiritual life-content itself
which it helps to beget. The contrast between form
and content of our thought, from which such an ac-
ceptation of a greater primitiveness of language is in-
ferred, is an abstraction useful for certain purposes
but it ought not to embarrass the insight into the real
connection of phenomena.
Language is possible as an intelligent form of ex-
pression of ideas only because these ideas themselves
and the feelings and impulses attached to them are
common, so that the sound used by the individual is
immediately comprehended as the fit representation of
what all feel. The domain of a common language,
therefore, includes in and for itself a common life with
all that belongs to it. Religious views, customs, con-
ceptions of right cannot, therefore, be regarded as a
common life-content, which could only arise after a
more perfect development of language and perhaps
also in another way and with intellectual powers other
than they, but all intellectual life is, so far as we are
able to trace it back, one entirety inseparably united
in all of its essentials ; and here as in other fields
nothing can so seriously embarrass comprehension as
the frequent mistake of transferring logical distinc-
tions, which owe their origin to our conceptual method
of representing things, to the things themselves.
It is a vain task to imagine, what man was or could
have been ere he possessed a language and common
views of life finding expression in language, and in
general ere he was a social being. We not only know
nothing of such sn isolated existence of individuals,
but besides we cannot even think of man with the at-
tributes, which he actually possesses, as thus having
ever existed. We may accept an animal existence of
man prior to the possession of language, yet even here
some kind of common life similar perhaps to such states
as we know of among certain associations of animals,
must have existed, if the anthropoid should develop
into man. For as the life phenomena of the commu-
nity everywhere depend upon the intellectual powers
of individuals, so the latter need, none the less, a col-
lective life by which every individual development is
sustained and conditioned in its work. But the special
national community to which the individual belongs is.
also in its turn subject to the conditions of the historical
development in which it arose, and which act upon it
unceasingly during its continuance and decline. Thus
the individual life is a passing wave upon the stream
of national life, flowing along through the centuries,
with which it finally mingles in the immeasurable ocean
of the intellectual life-totality of humanity.
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How worthless, contrasted with this view, which is
everywhere stated so clearly by the facts of intellect-
ual development, appear the conceptions of rational-
ism and utilitarianism, with their theories of contract
and invention according to which the individual man,
unchangeable as the rock in the billowy sea, is supposed
to withstand the influences assailing him from without,
to be thrust hither and thither by them, to be united
indeed with others of his like into conglomerates, but
himself always only a whole, always without other aim
than to maintain himself. To be sure the defenders of
this doctrine have rarely acknowledged the practical
consequences to which it leads. For it is, fortunately,
peculiar to one-sided ethical theories that they are
continually refuted by the practical life of their ad-
herents.
[to be concluded.]
NATURE AND MORALITY.
AN EXAMINATION OF THE ETHICAL VIEWS OF JOHN
STUART MILL.
[concluded.]
IV. THE ANTHROPOMORPHIC STANDPOINT OF MR. MILL.
Mr. Mill in opposing the conclusions drawn from
an anthropomorphic conception of nature, impercept-
ibly slips into the same erroneous position. He treats
nature as if it were a person and arraigns nature for
immorality. He looks upon every progress as a fur-
ther aberration from nature and speaks of the lower
stages of savage life as " the times when mankind were
nearer to their natural state." Thus he easily proves
that nature is chaos and that civilisation is a conquest
of man over nature. As if man were not a part of na-
ture ! " To dig, to plough, to build, to wear clothes,"
Mr. Mill declares, "are direct infringements of the
injunctions to follow nature."
If we accepted Mr. Mill's usage of the word nature,
which deliberately excludes man's exertions from the
sphere of the natural, we should have to declare that
man's entire being is " supernatural." The adversaries
of Mr. Mill may very well thank him for his method
of attack, for he furnishes evidence in support of the
very conception he so eagerly attempts to overthrow.
It is, of course, allowable to use the concept nature in
this restricted sense, as Mr. Mill does. We may de-
fine our words as we please ; but if we were to limit
the word nature always to the lower stages of natural
evolution, we should recognise the truth that the "su-
pernatural" naturally grows from the natural. The
supernatural has been regarded as having come into
nature from spheres beyond by some extra-mundane
intercession; and we discard the idea of supernatural-
ism simply and solely in order to avoid this miscon-
ception. If by "supernatural" is understood that
higher kind of nature which evolves from the lower
stages of nature, we shall entertain no objection to the
word.
Nature is not a person and natural laws are not the
decrees of a personal being. The order of nature is
not a scheme designed for an end. Nevertheless nature
has an aim. Every process of nature has an aim,
every motion has a certain direction and if all the nat-
ural processes are viewed as a whole, they possess in
their entirety also an aim. Our scientists have form-
ulated the general aim of nature and call it evolution.
If we look upon nature as a person, we are led to ab-
surdities, but if we look upon nature not only as pur-
poseless but also as aimless, we sink into a bottomless
pit of errors and confusion.
Nature being no person, we cannot speak of nature
as being moral or immoral. Nature is non-moral.
Persons alone, individual beings, can be moral or im-
moral ; and morality is nothing but the intentional con-
formity to nature and to the order of nature.
It has been said that God is moral. There is no
sense in speaking of God as moral—unless it be in
popular language where the usage of the phrase is to
be regarded as an excusable and allowable poetic li-
cense (within certain limits even quite legitimate).
God can only be called the standard of morality. God
is non-moral ; man only, if he conforms to the will of
God, can be said to be moral.
* *
Mr. Mill in arraigning nature for being beset with
all kinds of vices, disorder^ uncleanliness, and cowar-
dice, is very emphatic in denouncing her injustice.
He says :
" It is one of Nature's general rules, and part of her habitual
injustice, that ' to him that hath shall be given, but from him that
hath not, shall be taken even that which he hath.' The ordinary
and predominant tendency of good is towards more good. Health,
strength, wealth, knowledge, virtue, are not only good in them-
selves but facilitate and promote the acquisition of good, both of
the same and of other kinds. The person who can learn easily,
is he who already knows much ; it is the strong and not the sickly
person who can do everything which most conduces to health ;
those who find it easy to gain money are not the poor but the
rich ; while health, strength, knowledge, talents, are all means of
acquiring riches, and riches are often an indispensable means of
acquiring these. Again, e converse, whatever may be said of evil
turning into good, the general tendency of evil is towards further
evil. Bodily illness renders the body more susceptible of disease
;
it produces incapacity of exertion, sometimes debility of mind,
and often the loss of means of subsistence. All severe pain, either
bodily or mental, tends to increase the susceptibilities of pain for
ever after. Poverty is the parent of a thousand mental and moral
evils. What is still worse, to be injured or oppressed, when ha-
bitual, lowers the whole tone of the character. One bad action
leads to others, both in the agent himself, in the bystanders, and
in the sufferers. All bad qualities are strengthened by habit, and
all vices and follies'tend to spread. Intellectual defects generate
moral, and moral, intellectual ; and every intellectual or moral
defect generates others and so on without end.
"
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It is certainly true that "to him that hath shall be
given, but from him that hath not, shall be taken
even that which he hath;" but it is perfectl)' useless to
complain about it. It is neither justice nor injustice,
but it is a law of nature or if you prefer the expression,
it is the will of God ; and we have to mind it.
To speak of the injustice of nature is just as an-
thropomorphic as to speak of the morality of God.
Mill's mistake is that he argues from an antiquated
theological standpoint which is, even among theolo-
gians, not at all the universally accepted view.
Morality may be described as our attempts to im-
prove the given state of nature, but it certainly can
never improve the order of nature. All the improve-
ments we can make upon the given state of nature,
have to be based upon the unalterable order of nature,
and he who attempts to formulate any rules of action,
be it in the department of industrial enterprises, in
social and political reform, or in the realm of moral
aspirations, will have to do it after a careful study of
facts. The irrefragable laws of nature form the im-
movable basis upon which we have to take our stand.
Whatever action we undertake, before we plan or de-
vise, we must take heed of the laws to which we have
to conform. The laws of nature and among them the
moral laws, are not flexible, they are stern and im-
mutable. If we cannot understand the nature of things
in scientific abstractness, and if (in order to under-
stand the earnest necessity that the moral law must be
obeyed) we represent the order of nature as a personal
being, it will be well to remember the parable of Christ
in which he compares God to a hard man, reaping
where he has not sown and gathering where he has
not strewed. If we have received one talent only,
there is but one way to keep that one talent ; we must
go and trade with the same and make with it another
talent. But if the very knowledge that we have to
deal with a hard man, induces us to be afraid, so as to
go and hide that one talent in the earth, then, that one
talent will be taken from us.
The parable of the talents is very instructive. Its
doctrine seems severe on the poor, especially those
who are poor in spirit ; but it is just as much severe
on the rich. Christ spoke to the poor and his applica-
tion was made so as to impress their minds, that he
who has received little is no less responsible for that
little, than he who has received much for the much he
has received. "For unto whomsoever much is given,
of him shall be much required, and to whom men have
committed much, of him they will ask the more." If
Christ had spoken to the rich, the learned, and the
great, he might have made a different application of
the parable and might have told them of the servant
who having received five talents had not only buried
but wasted the rich gift. There are perhaps more men
ruined through having received too much than by
having received too little. The temptations are greater
in the former case, and the dire necessity of the latter
case often exercises a wholesome and educating in-
fluence.
If justice means that every servant, whether he in-
creases the talents he has received or buries them in
the earth, should in the end receive an equal share,
Mr. Mill would be justified in denouncing the course
of nature as unjust. But it appears to me advisable
that any one who thus indicts the very order of nature
for injustice, imagining that the whole universe is
wrong and he alone and perhaps also a few fellow be-
ings of his with him are right, should first revise the
logic of his conception of justice ; for it is in such a
case most probable that on close scrutiny he will
somewhere discover a flaw in his idea of justice.
* *
Mr. Mill's objection to basing ethics upon nature
was made to oppose a theological conception of ethics.
Our traditional religions, we must know, are in their
intentions monistic, they are dualistic only if the al-
legory of their symbols is taken as literal truth. In
opposing the theology of traditional religions Mr.
Mill attacked erroneously their very heart, the monistic
meaning of their doctrines instead of striking at the
dualistic interpretation of their mythology. Thus if
Mr. Mill were right in his objection to basing ethics
upon nature— i. e. upon the unalterable, the eternal
in nature, upon the law of nature or to use the relig-
ious and most pregnant term, upon God—if Mr. Mill
were right, there would be two alternatives left : Either
there is no ethics at all, which view Mr. Mill would
not accept, or the dualistic interpretation of theology
is correct, that ethics is an extramundane factor.
When ethics and the conditions of ethical ideals
are found and can be proved to be an immanent part
of nature, the dualistic interpretation of the old re-
ligions will have to be surrendered while their monis-
tic meaning which is after all the core and living spirit
of all religious aspirations will appear in a stronger
light than ever. p. c.
USE AND BEAUTY IN SCIENCE.
BY S. V. CLEVENGER, M. D.
In his " Essay on Beauty," Ralph Waldo Emerson
says :
' Astfology interested us for it tied man to the system. In-
stead of an isolated beggar, the farthest star felt him, and he felt
the star. However rash and however falsified by pretenders and
traders in it, the hint was true and divine, the soul's avowal of its
large relations, that climate, century, remote natures as well as
near are part of its biography. Chemistry takes to pieces but it
does not construct. Alchemy which sought to transmute our ele-
ments into another, to prolong life, to arm with power,—that was
in the right direction. All our sciences lack a human side. The
tenant is more than the house. Bugs, and stamens, and spores on
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which we lavish so many years, are not finalities, and man, when
his powers unfold in order, will take nature along with him and
emit light into all her recesses. The human heart concerns us
more than the peering into microscopes, and is larger than can be
measured by the pompous figures of the astronomer."
Had Emerson's broad intellect been engaged in
scientific directions he would have been heartily
ashamed of having written such stuff. Herbert Spen-
cer writes that science opens up new beauties in the
universe to which the uninstructed are blind. Hugh
Miller, Herschel, Faraday, Tyndall, Huxley, could
have made Emerson's heart leap for joy at their reve-
lations, and his writings would have been enhanced
in their power for good.
The very reverse of Errierson's idea is true.
Astrology and alchemy with other "philosophies"
of the days of sorcery, the black art by which one
creature hoped to be able to take foul advantage of
another, were emanations of the night of time, when
burnings at the stake were frequent alike for thinkers
and witches. The horoscope is still cast by Indian
fakirs, and astrology thrives there amidst appropriate
surroundings. And doubtless Emerson would have
opened his eyes in surprise if asked whether he pre-
ferred to live in the land of jungles and the suttee
rather than among spectacles and baked beans.
Looking back over the evolution of the sciences, it
is plain that in astrology and alchemy, it was not the
love of science that actuated these studies ; the object
primarily was puerile. The philosopher's stone, which
would transmute all metals into gold ; the elixir vitae,
which was to confer everlasting youth, were the ab-
surd things sought for, and so in the search, expedi-
tions throughout the world were actuated by greed
and love of power. The march of Coronado hunting
for the seven golden cities. Ponce de Leon's childish
rambles through Florida looking for the fountain of
youth, are instances in point.
It is quite probable that among the ancient Roman,
Greek, and Egyptian priests many physical laws were
understood, but the only use they made of them was
to deceive the people and enrich themselves. Among
the vast multitude of to-day such a thing as cultivating
a science for its own sake or to benefit the public
would seem absurd, and so the medical student of
lesser calibre would complain upon being compelled
to learn chemistry and botany, and especially bacte-
riology, when in many instances all these bear directly
upon general medicine.
Chemistry sprang from alchemy, and astronomy
from astrology. At first the facts that were discov-
ered could not be used and so they were mainly re-
garded as curiosities. Eventually these neglected dis-
coveries were found to be of great use. Had it been
possible for the childish ancient philosophers to have
developed the sciences to their present status, most
of them would have certainly made selfish and op-
pressive uses of their knowledge. As knowledge is
slow of growth, so it broadens the intellect of its vo-
taries, making them more merciful and considerate,
particularly nowadays when scientific fakirism is not
so possible as in olden times ; and so it would seem
that as fast as the world deserves the comforts afforded
by science it receives them, and no faster.
Probably even in the future if the elixir vitae were
compounded and immortality were thus placed in the
grasp of everyone, no one would be so foolish as to use
it, for all would realise that perpetual life would be
perpetual suffering.
Franklin was asked once, what was the good of
the discovery of the galvanic spark. He asked, "What
is the good of a baby ?" That baby has since grown
to giant size. The vast accumulation of scientific
facts by which the world is to-day beautified and made
more comfortable have been piled up amid sneers and
opposition. The olden searcher for knowledge wanted
to make a short cut to power over his fellow men ; the
student of to-day learns to spread his knowledge as a
means of helping himself through helping others. So
as intellects broaden, men find that by all working for
the common good, the individual good would be best
conserved.
Imagine Nero or Cleopatra with all our present
scientific knowledge and resources at command, would
they not have made the earth a pitiable planet? But
this knowledge cannot be owned by any single mind,
and hence working in unison for the common good is
the result of the existence of that knowledge.
As science gradually inculcated altruism, perforce,
the teleologist idea would be that as fast as the world
deserved good things it received them, but the more
rational view would be that the comforts and conve-
niences of the peaceful arts and sciences were the pro-
duct of mental broadening, and that egoism developed
into an altruism through selfish realisation that indi--
vidual interests are best secured through individuals
seeking the general good.
CURRENT TOPICS.
The Australian voting system was again tested in Chicago at
the recent City election, and was condemned as a ruinous failure
by the curbstone patriots who formerly taught the citizen how to
vote, and chastised him when he voted wrong. Sadly, the story
goes, as I copy it from the papers, that " Even in the gth and 6th
wards only a few eyes were bunged up, and a few hats smashed,
while the policemen looked the other way." And the 5th ward,
which,— I quote again the plaintive wail of ihe papers— " the sun-
set of an election day formerly found suffused with blood and
arnica, was peaceful and stagnant as the south branch of the Chi-
cago river." The dramatic appearance of an imaginary Good Sa-
maritan with a bottle of arnica at " the sunset of an election day ''
is well managed by the reporter, as it relieves the sombre gloom
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of the story, and antithetically presents to us the bane and the an-
tidote, the sore and the salve together. There is a legend of that
same 5th ward, fabulous I think, although said to be well authen-
ticated, that a man once got his head broke there on election day
for voting wrong, and died under the correction. It was shown
at the inquest by a surgeon that the skull of the deceased was no
thicker than an egg shell, whereupon the jury brought in a verdict
of "temporary insanity, and sarved him right," on the ground
that a man with a skull no thicker than an egg shell had no busi-
ness trying to vote in the 5th ward. In kindly tribute to the days
of "auld lang syne " the reporter gives a word of sympathy to the
policemen ' ' who leaned up against the doorways and grumbled
because the good old days were gone. They did not know whom
to club. Under the uncertainties of the Australian system they
might have injured some of their own friends." I am sorry for
the policemen thus embarrassed, but in the midst of the gloom I
sing with Charles Mackay, "Who mourns for the days that are
gone ? I' faith, good friend, not I."
The subject of debate before the Milwaukee Ministers' Asso-
ciation at its recent meeting, was the smooth and easy marriage
laws of Wisconsin, whereby all the runaway couples from other
states are invited to cross the border and get married without
banns, or leave, or license. By reason of this liberality the mar-
rying trade has grown to be a thriving industry in Milwaukee,
greatly to the profit of clergymen, who it has been irreverently
said were sometimes overzealous in duty, and " tied the hymeneal
knot" for lovesick boys and girls without asking any embarrassing
questions, provided the fees were paid. Hundreds of elopers from
Chicago get married in Milwaukee, and our people rightfully com-
plain of this, not as a matter of morals, but as a species of unfair
competition very injurious to the Chicago marrying trade. The
Milwaukee ministers, in answering the accusation, threw the
blame upon the lax marriage laws of Wisconsin, which caused the
wicked hackmen of Milwaukee to tempt the clergy by hauling run-
away couples to the "parsonage," and helping the minister to
unite them in " the holy bonds of matrimony " for a share of the
marriage fee. The Rev. Mr. Parkhurst thus exposed the deprav-
ity of the hackmen ; "The hackman," he said, " first located min-
isters as near the railway station as possible, and ascertained what
hours they could usually be found in, next he found out whether
the minister asked too many searching questions of the runaway
couples, and lastly he made sure that the minister would make a
division of the marriage fees. If that was satisfactory the hackman
then became a regular runner for that minister and took all his
trade to him." The conference was very properly shocked at the
conduct of the hackmen, and a committee was appointed to pre-
pare an address to the public explaining the attitude of the minis-
ters on the runaway marriage question.
The Milwaukee hackmen, being wiser than the clergymen,
have not had any meeting to complain of the Wisconsin marriage
laws. They think it better to say nothing, lest the legislature in-
terfere with the runaway couple business, an important "home
industry," very profitable to the hackmen, the clergymen, and
the hotel keepers of Milwaukee. One of them, a metaphorical
sort of man, treated the good resolutions of the Milwaukee Min-
isters' Association as of no more honesty than a party platform,
and he said, "There's nothing in 'em. We know our business.
We do the hauling, say nothing, and saw wood. There's plenty
of ministers that want our trade, and we know it. All they want
is for us fellows to say nothing." Another, equally cunning, but
broader in mental scope, and more profound in learning, said
"There's a good bit in it for the hackmen and the ministers too.
More Chicago people come up here to get spliced than anybody
knows of. They come in on one train, get tied, and away they go
back on the next train. Now I claim that's a good thing for the
town
;
it's foreign capital coming in and nothing going out." That
sentiment is worthy of Adam Smith or Stuart Mill, and it reveals
to us in homely grammar a political economist and statesman.
That the man who uttered it should waste himself in hack driving
is wonderful. Why he is not a member of Congress I cannot un-
derstand. And look at the skill by which he dispenses with the
middleman, and brings the producer and the consumer closer to-
gether. " We used to take these ' moonshine' couples to the ho-
tels," he said, "but now we deliver the goods direct." In the tone
of a moralist and with the sneer of a cynic he finished his remarks
by saying, "I guess the ministers won't hurt themselves by trying
to have a new marriage law passed."
I desire to add by way of postscript, and as a hint to the Mil-
waukee ministers in case they have not heard of it, that the Rev.
S. F. Butts, deacon of the Methodist Episcopal Church of Cum-
berland, Maryland, has been suspended by the Presiding elder of
the district, for practices like those charged upon the ministers of
Milwaukee, except that in the case of Mr. Butts, he obtained a
monopoly of the marrying trade, by means of a secret agreement
with hackdrivers for a division of the marriage fees, thus exclud-
ing his reverend brethren from a fair share of the business. Ac-
cording to the dispatches, which I quote lileraiiiii, "Mr. Butts
stood in with the hackdrivers and cornered the marriage market.
The other ministers could not understand how it was that their
colleague did all the business while they were left out in the cold.
"
It was six months before they found him out, during the whole of
which time "Butts had all the marriages he could attend to," and
was rolling in wealth, or according to the pathetic story which de-
scribes his rise and fall, "He alone married more than half the
out-of-town couples and was making money handily, when the
other preachers got on to his methods and preferred charges with
the Presiding elder. Butt's suspension followed."
Did you ever think about the vast quantity of genius annually
wasted on the newspapers by merely local reporters who are not
paid for originality or style, but merely to "write it up." Probably
not, but I have, and I tell you there is enough of it if saved in
book form to make literary fame for a hundred men. And let me
tell you another thing, there are men of literary fame who steal a
good deal of it and sell it for money as their own. When a friend
shows me a bit of good work, either in prose or poetr)', and tells
me that he just " threw it off" last night, I praise him openly to
his face, while secretly I doubt his word ; and if the composition
is extremely good, I suspect that it is due to the oil and the toil of
many nights, and the thought of many days. But when there is
only one evening between the deed and the printed story of it, then
I know that the writer of the story " threw it off last night," and I
give him credit accordingly ; as, for instance, the account of ye.s-
terday's election which I find in this morning's paper ; and which
I thank the reporter for presenting to me in a well-fitting dress,
with flowers of humor and fancy in the button hole, and embroid-
ery of rhetoric where such adornment ought to be. Like a dash
of Worcestershire sauce on a tender steak, is the sarcasm, pungent
and refined, which excites my appetite when I read that the voters
of a certain ward, " objected to Cooper because he wore a silk hat
and went into good society." What further description of that
ward is necessary ? I see its alleys and courts, and beer saloons
as in a photograph, and I know without looking at the returns
what became of Cooper. So, there is equal pictorial strength, and
saving of words too, mind you, for which economy I am told
the reporter gets no pay, in the description of a winning candi-
date, who, "proud and victorious, tramped down Ashland avenue,
with his big red face divided by a triumphant smile." There is
high art in that, for I know without looking that the victorious
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candidate is a saloon keeper, and I see him laughing clear across
his face from ear to ear. " His face divided by a smile " is humor-
ous poetry, worthy of Butler, and I maintain there is no more ex-
pressive line in Hudibras.
I was engaged in showing some of the pearls cast before swine
by nameless and undistinguished reporters, when I was interrupted
by a call to lunch, and I will now continue the subject with a few
"additional instances from that same election story. "Peaceful as
a tramp in a haystack," said of the 23rd ward, is a picturesque de-
scription that saves a multitude of words. I cannot imagine any-
thing more sleepy, quiet, and careless than a tramp in a haystack ;
and the comparison is poetical too. Of a certain candidate, no-
torious for his expansive liberality on election days, I learn that
"About 2 o'clock he went to his house on 20th street and laid in a
new stock of campaign arguments in small denominations." I put
in the italics because I think them well deserved. No coarse and
ugly dead wall statement there, but a delicate and genteel euphem-
ism which tells it all in a vivid and effective way. It is the bright
rapier instead of the dull club. The munificence of that candidate
is made visible in the same artistic style, so delightful to read, and
so easy to understand, thus : " Then he went to the saloon of Jan
Novak and put up for a new freshet of beer, which soon had the
neighborhood in a sloppy condition." Not kegs of beer, nor bar-
rels of beer as a commonplace reporter would have had it, but a
"freshet" of beer; and the poetical exaggeration is ingeniously
corroborated by the further testimony that the neighborhood was
made "sloppy" with beer, and by this evidence the fact of the
freshet proved. I have read, in another paper, another account of
that same election. It contains just as much information as the one
I have spoken of in these comments ; but there is no yeast of witty
imagination in it, to " raise " it, and make it light, and easy of di-
gestion. It is dull, soggy, inelastic dough, and altogether too much
of it. M. M. Trumbull.
CORRESPONDENCE.
,
THE PROBLEM OF NECESSITY.
To the Editor of The Open Court :
Replying to the request of Mr. John Maddock to name a fact
"not precisely determined by law," permit me to suggest the
Asymptote, the ratio of diameter and circumference ; and gener-
ally any fact for whose accurate finding intellect is baffled. Action
and reaction are as equal, contrary, and simultaneous in mentality
as in mechanics. Man is unquestionably the resultant of all the
countless influences which have focused the past in his being. Is
it inconceivable that he possesses a volition,—utterly unprovable
though it be,—resident in his nature, and yet of a different order,
of an order as infinite and eternal (and paradoxical) as the insol-
uble subtlety of the antinomy ? Hudor Genone.
[The instances of Hudor Genone for proving the existence of
something "not precisely determined by law" are not well se-
lected, for the ratio of diameter to circumference and also the
asymptote are most unequivocally determined by law. We cannot
arithmetically express the ratio of diameter to circumference in
all its actual determinedness. All the calculations made of ir, al-
though they are more than sufficiently exact for any practical pur-
poses, are theoretically considered mere approximations. But ;r
itself is nevertheless precisely determined by law.
Mr. Maddock, it seems to me, denies that man has volition.
We should not say so. It is a fact that man has volition. This
is not unprovable as says Hudor Genone ; on the contrary, it is
provable, and this volition, being ' ' resident in his nature " or rather
"his nature itself " is exactly that which determines man's actions.
We do not see why man's volition should be of a different order,
why it alone should be eternal and the rest of nature not, why it
alone should be branded as paradoxical while the rest of nature
is regarded as intelligible.
—
Ed.]
NOTES.
A very welcome letter comes to us from Mr. George Julian
Harney, of England, whose " Notes on Books," and other things
in The Newcastle Chronicle are such delightful reading. Mr. Harney
has made some valuable contributions to The Open Court and
would have made more were it not that for several months he has
been seriously ill. We rejoice to learn from his letter that the
opening spring has tempered Mr. Harney's pains, and that his
health is much improved. There is yet some good work remaining
for him to do
George Julian Harney is an historic personage, and was
a conspicuous figure in England fifty years ago. He bas a
strong memory and if he would write or dictate his reminis-
cences they would be an interesting and valuable contribution
to the political history of England. Harney, seventy-five, and
Thomas Cooper eighty-eight, are the last surviving leaders of
the Chartist movement, the precursor of all the political, and
many of the social reforms which have been achieved in Eng-
land during the reign of Queen Victoria. They got imprisonment
for blazing the way, while the Gladstones and the Russells, and
the Palmerston's, who followed, got the glory. Harney, Hether-
ington, Holyoake, Richard Carlisle, and a few others gave Eng-
land a free press. They sold unstamped newspapers, went to
prison for the deed, but won their battle after all. We trust that
Mr. Harney will find renewed health and vigor in the sunshine of
spring.
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